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Summary
The upcoming 2005 round of military base closings has stimulated interest among
potentially affected communities in how the bases to be selected for closure might be
economically redeveloped to replace lost jobs.  Environmental contamination can
present a challenge to economic redevelopment, if funding or technological constraints
would limit cleanup of the land to a degree that would be safe for its intended use.  Most
of the lands on bases closed under the previous four rounds have been cleaned up for
their intended reuse, and have been transferred for redevelopment.  However, some
bases have yet to be cleaned up to an extent that would be adequate for the planned land
use, presenting an obstacle to replacing lost jobs.  Bases closed under the 2005 round
could face similar delays in redevelopment, if a community’s preferred land use would
necessitate a costly and time-consuming degree of cleanup.   This report will be updated
as events warrant.
Introduction
Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Congress authorized four rounds
of military base closings and realignments in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995.1  As of the end
of FY2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) had completed these actions and reduced
its domestic infrastructure by about 20%.  Although closure of installations under all four
rounds is complete, environmental cleanup and economic redevelopment of some of these
properties continues.
The pace and cost of cleaning up environmental contamination on base closure lands
has been an ongoing issue, because of concern about human health and environmental
risks and the public’s desire to redevelop these properties for civilian uses.  The
completion of cleanup is often a key factor in economic redevelopment, because the land
cannot be used for its intended purpose until it is cleaned up to a degree that would be safe
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for reuse.  DOD issued its recommendations for another round of base closings and
realignments on May 13, 2005, subject to review by a specially appointed commission,
and approval by the President and Congress.2  The upcoming round has raised concern
among communities as to whether the cleanup of environmental contamination may pose
challenges in redeveloping additional bases to replace lost jobs.
This report provides an overview of cleanup requirements for the transfer and reuse
of base closure properties, discusses the status of property transfer on bases closed under
prior rounds, examines costs to clean up bases closed under these prior rounds, and offers
relevant observations and estimates of cleanup costs for the upcoming 2005 round.
Cleanup Requirements for Property Transfer and Reuse
Section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA, commonly referred to as Superfund) generally requires the
United States (in this case, DOD) to clean up closed bases prior to transfer out of federal
ownership.3  Property on a closed base is typically transferred to a local redevelopment
authority (LRA) responsible for implementing a plan for civilian reuse.
To speed redevelopment, CERCLA authorizes early transfer under certain
conditions.4  For bases on the National Priorities List (NPL) of the nation’s most
hazardous waste sites, early transfer requires the concurrence of DOD, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the governor of the state in which the property is located.
For bases not on the NPL, concurrence of only DOD and a governor is required for early
transfer.  Early transfer can be advantageous in terms of redevelopment, if the intended
land use would not present the potential for human exposure to contamination, and
therefore not require cleanup.  Conversely, redevelopment still could be delayed despite
early transfer, if cleanup would be necessary to make the intended land use safe.
Whether a property is transferred after cleanup, or transferred early, the degree of
cleanup can vary from site to site, depending on the cleanup standard used and the remedy
selected to attain it.  CERCLA does not specify cleanup standards for particular
substances.  Rather, it requires that cleanup comply with all legally applicable, relevant
and appropriate requirements (ARARs) to protect human health and the environment,
which include a host of federal and state standards for various hazardous substances.5 
CERCLA does not explicitly require the consideration of land use in determining the
degree of cleanup.  However, in practice, land use is a key factor in deciding which
cleanup standard is used, and what remedy is selected to attain it.  Cleanup standards
generally are stricter for land uses that would result in greater risk of human exposure to
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contamination.  For example, cleanup is typically more stringent and more costly for land
uses such as residential development, which could pose a higher risk of exposure to
sensitive populations including children and the elderly.  Cleanup is typically the least
stringent and the least costly for industrial land uses, such as manufacturing, which could
pose less risk of exposure.
EPA, or the overseeing state agency, is responsible for determining whether the
selected remedy would attain the cleanup standard for a specific site.6   EPA has issued
non-binding guidance for considering the “reasonably anticipated land use” in selecting
cleanup remedies.7  DOD and the community, usually through the LRA, are responsible
for determining how the land will be reused, in negotiating the terms of the property
transfer.  However, the community’s ability to attain its preferred use is constrained, as
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act does not require DOD to dispose of
property on a closed base for a particular land use, nor within a certain time frame.8
Impediments to conveying the land for redevelopment may surface if DOD is resistant to
transferring it for a purpose that the community desires because of cost considerations or
technological limitations affecting cleanup of the contamination.  EPA’s guidance, noted
above, acknowledges that some land uses may not be practical due to such challenges, and
indicates that the cleanup objective may need to be revised, which may result in
“different, more reasonable land use(s).”9
In addition to land use, numerous other factors can determine the degree and cost of
cleanup, raising further issues.  For example, cleanup does not necessarily require the
removal of contamination, if a safe method of containing it is available to prevent
exposure.  Although containment is typically less costly than removal, some of the
savings of containment can be offset by the costs of maintaining the containment method
over the long term to ensure that it remains effective in preventing exposure.  Tensions
may arise between DOD and the community, if there is disagreement over the method
selected to prevent exposure.  Communities frequently prefer removal rather than
containment, because of concerns about lingering risks and continuing costs if the method
of containment were to fail over time.  However, DOD may prefer containment to save
costs, due to limited funding for the cleanup of many closed bases across the country. 
Once a land use is agreed upon between DOD and the community, and a cleanup
remedy is selected to make it safe for that land use, DOD generally administers and pays
for the cleanup, regardless of whether cleanup is completed prior to transfer, or
subsequently under an early transfer.  In the case of an early transfer, the property
recipient may choose to administer the cleanup as a means to speed the reuse of the land,
but DOD typically would still pay the costs.  
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DOD remains obligated after cleanup is complete, if additional contamination is
found later that requires remediation. However, DOD is obligated for further cleanup only
to the extent that the degree of contamination found later would exceed applicable
standards for the land use originally agreed upon for the transfer.  If a community decides
to use the land for another purpose that would require further cleanup, DOD would not
be responsible for paying for it.  In such cases, the additional costs of cleanup to make the
land safe for a different purpose would be the responsibility of the property recipient.
Status of Property Transfer on Closed Bases10
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that, as of the end of FY2003,
364,000 acres (72%) of the 504,000 acres of land on bases closed during the previous four
rounds had been transferred for reuse.  Approximately 95% of the transferred acreage had
been transferred after cleanup was completed.  Although early transfer has the potential
to speed redevelopment, it has been used relatively infrequently for several reasons, such
as the reluctance of a community to accept property before cleanup is finished and the
lack of consensus within a community on reuse.  DOD also may be hesitant to agree to
early transfer if it would be required to expend more cleanup funds earlier than would be
necessary otherwise, to make the land safe for reuse more quickly.
Approximately 91,000 acres (18%) on closed bases had been leased for reuse prior
to the completion of cleanup.  However, pending cleanup has delayed the permanent
transfer of these properties, with reuse limited to purposes that would be safe considering
the degree of contamination still present on these lands and the potential risk of human
exposure.  The remaining 49,000 acres (10%) had not been leased or transferred for reuse
primarily because of environmental cleanup challenges. GAO found that some cleanup
is necessary before transfer can occur on 98% of Air Force, 82% of Army, and 65% of
Navy lands still awaiting transfer.
Cleanup Costs of Past Base Closure Rounds  
DOD estimates that the closure of bases under the previous four rounds has resulted
in an annual savings of $7 billion in operational expenses.  The costs of environmental
cleanup have run into billions of dollars, discussed below, and have offset some of these
savings gained from a reduced military infrastructure.   However, a portion of the cleanup
costs would have been incurred regardless, as DOD is required to clean up its operational
installations at least to a degree that would be safe for military uses, somewhat reducing
this offset.  The incremental cost and time to clean up a closed base depends primarily on
how extensive the cleanup must be to make the land safe for uses that would be less
restrictive than military purposes, and pose a higher risk of human exposure.  DOD
reports that it had incurred approximately $7 billion in cleanup costs through FY2004 at
bases closed under the previous four rounds.11  This amount reflects the actual costs of
the cleanup process, from site identification and investigation to selection, design,
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construction, operation, and monitoring of cleanup remedies.12  About 44% of the $7
billion was spent on cleanup in California, where DOD has identified more contaminated
sites on closed bases than any other state.
Although the majority of the acreage on bases closed under the previous four rounds
has been cleaned up and transferred, estimates of future costs to complete cleanup on
lands awaiting transfer, and on those transferred early, remain substantial.  DOD estimates
that over $3 billion would be necessary to complete cleanup of known contamination on
these lands,13 with 59% of these costs attributed to cleanup in California.  However, future
costs could be higher than estimated, if new, or more stringent, regulations are issued that
require a greater degree of cleanup than anticipated. Future costs also could be more than
expected if unknown environmental threats, such as unexploded ordnance or additional
hazardous substances, are discovered.  On the other hand, costs at some sites may prove
lower if more cost-effective cleanup technologies become available.
Relevant Observations for the Upcoming 2005 Round
The amount of money and time required to clean up additional bases recommended
for closure in the 2005 round would depend on the type and extent of contamination
present on those properties, and the actions that would be necessary to make the land safe
for reuse.  Cleanup can take many years, as the continuing remediation of certain bases
closed between 1988 and 1995 demonstrates.  As in prior rounds, availability of funding
and capabilities of remediation technologies could limit the degree of cleanup of
installations that may be closed in the 2005 round, making certain land uses infeasible and
posing challenges to economic redevelopment.
The following table indicates DOD estimates to complete cleanup at the 33 “major”
installations it has recommended for closure in 2005.  (A total cost estimate for these
installations is not provided because an estimate was not readily available for certain sites
that are part of larger installations.)  These cost estimates are based on a degree of cleanup
that would be safe for the current military use of the land.  If a property were to be used
for less restrictive purposes that would result in a higher risk of human exposure to
contamination, a greater degree of cleanup likely would be required to make the land safe
for that use.  In such circumstances, more funding and additional time may be needed to
complete cleanup than DOD currently has planned.  Some cleanup also may be necessary
on realigned installations if the change in the installation’s mission would involve the
transfer of contaminated land that is no longer needed by DOD.
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Major Military Installations Recommended by DOD for Closure in 2005:
Past Cleanup Costs Incurred and Estimates of Future Cleanup Costs
Installation State Actual CostsThrough FY2004
Estimated Costs to
Completion
Kulis Air Guard Station Alaska a a
Corona Naval Support Activity b California $0 $0
Onizuka Air Force Station b California $139,000 $0
River Bank Army Ammunition Plant California $53,664,000 $5,091,000
Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station (Concord Detachment) California c c
New London Naval Submarine Base Connecticut $57,642,000 $23,141,000
Atlanta Naval Air Station Georgia $1,473,000 $2,596,000
Fort Gillem Georgia $21,790,000 $14,800,000
Fort McPherson Georgia $7,924,000 $7,301,000
Newport Chemical Depot Indiana $19,366,000 $4,874,000
Kansas Army Ammunition Plant Kansas $32,165,000 $25,271,000
New Orleans Naval Support Activity b Louisiana $283,000 $0
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Maine $48,614,000 $35,256,000
Otis Air National Guard Base Massachusetts d d
Selfridge Army Activity Michigan $17,000 $13,202,000
W.K. Kellogg Airport Air Guard Station b Michigan $4,878,000 $0
Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant Mississippi $0 $8,413,000
Pascagoula Naval Station Mississippi a a
Hawthorne Army Depot Nevada $35,539,000 $465,078,000
Fort Monmouth New Jersey $24,490,000 $3,642,000
Cannon Air Force Base b New Mexico $11,111,000 $0
Niagara Falls International Airport Air Guard Station New York $9,252,000 $1,254,000
Umatilla Chemical Depot Oregon $53,560,000 $10,390,000
Pittsburgh International Airport Air Reserve Station b Pennsylvania $600,000 $0
Willow Grove Naval Air Station Pennsylvania $6,867,000 $6,235,000
Ellsworth Air Force Base South Dakota $69,488,000 $26,397,000
Brooks City Base Texas $7,044,000 $3,415,000
Ingleside Naval Station Texas a a
Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant Texas $25,557,000 $1,156,000
Red River Army Depot Texas $34,464,000 $52,450,000
Deseret Chemical Depot Utah $21,096,000 $180,498,000
Fort Monroe Virginia $1,830,000 $201,165,000
General Mitchell Air Reserve Station Wisconsin e e
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service using information from the Department of Defense, Defense Environmental
Programs Annual Report to Congress for FY2004, April 2005, Appendix K and Appendix L, various pages.  The above dollar amounts
indicate costs for actions directly related to cleanup, and do not include indirect costs such as program management and support.  The above
table supersedes the table in the May 31st version of this CRS report, and reflects significantly revised amounts for some installations.
Discrepancies were subsequently discovered in DOD’s electronic database of cleanup cost estimates, upon which the original CRS table
was based.  The above table also supersedes the table in the June 6th version of this CRS report, to indicate those installations that are part
of larger installations, for which DOD did not provide a breakout of cleanup costs.  See footnotes c and d below.
a.  In the above report, DOD did not indicate sites where remediation of contamination was or is required as of the end of FY2004.
b.  DOD indicated that all planned cleanup actions were complete as of the end of FY2004.
c.  DOD reported $59.7 million in past cleanup costs through FY2004 and estimated future cleanup costs of $34.4 million for Seal Beach
Naval Weapons Station, but did not provide a breakout for the Concord Detachment of this installation.
d.  DOD reported $515.9 million in past cleanup costs through FY2004 and estimated future cleanup costs of $540.9 million for the
Massachusetts Military Reservation, but did not provide a breakout for Otis Air National Guard Base, located on the Reservation.
e.  DOD reported that cleanup was complete at General Mitchell Air Force Base, but did not indicate cleanup at the Air Reserve Station.
